

Administrative and Personnel Policies to Enhance Readiness and Lethality
FINAL REPORT

Executive Summary

Secretary of Defense Mattis' July 21, 2017, memorandum directed the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)) to lead the Department's effort to "determine changes to military personnel policies necessary to provide the Military Departments increased flexibility to organize, train, and equip more ready and lethal forces," and deliver recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSD) and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) by December 1, 2017. In a subsequent memorandum, Mr. Anthony Kurta, Performing the Duties of the USD(P&R), directed the convening of five Working Groups (WG):

- **Military Personnel Policies (Accession, Development, Retention)**
- **Civilian Personnel Policies (Talent Management)**
- **Military Training (Core Training)**
- **Strategic Thinking and Professional Military Education Development (The Art and Science of Warfighting)**
- **Strengthening Department of Defense (DoD) Counterintelligence(CI) (managed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)))**

During their work, each WG identified the problems with current administrative and personnel policies, focused on critical areas, conducted analysis of available data and previous studies, and provided findings and recommendations. Each provided recommendations that include target dates for implementation or completion, risk to success, cost, and Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) and Office of Coordinating Responsibility (OCR). The work and recommendations were reviewed by a senior steering group and the Defense Human Resources Board. Overall, there are 25 actions for USD(P&R), 6 actions for USD(I), and 5 decisions requiring DSD and VCJCS support (see Consolidated Recommendations chart). To implement these policy recommendations, separate plans of action were prepared or are under development (but not included in this report). If implemented, these recommended actions will provide concrete enhancements in readiness and lethality.

Military Personnel Policies Working Group

The Military Personnel Policies WG conducted an assessment of the Military Departments' non-deployable populations to establish standard reporting criteria that identify non-deployability categories, and to recommend potential policy and/or legislative changes that will result in a reduction of the non-deployable population and improve readiness for the entirety of Active and Reserve personnel. Their recommendations focus on establishing Department-wide definitions, reporting standards for non-deployables, and a Universal Retention Policy to reduce the overall number of non-deployables in several categories.

Recommended Actions:

1. Standardize reporting requirements. Completed; low risk; no new costs; OPR: DASD(MPP).

2. Establish universal retention policy on personnel deployability. Greater than 12 months of non-deployability will result in mandatory processing for separation. Target completion: 5 January 2018; low risk; requires system modification; OPR: DASD(MPP). Policy memorandum requires DSD signature.
3. Establish DoD-wide medical retention standards; develop guidelines to accelerate fitness evaluation for medical separation given certain conditions (pre-Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES)). Target completion: 1 July 2019; low risk; no new costs; OPR: DASD(HSP&O). Projected non-deployable decrease ~7,500.
4. Raise individual medical readiness goal for Active and Reserve personnel from 85 percent to 90 percent; reassess after 12 months. Target completion: 1 February 2018 (Services achieve by 1 February 2019); low risk; no new costs; OPR: DASD(HRP&O). Projected non-deployable decrease ~4500.
5. Review (MilDep) administrative separation approval authority to ensure it is at the lowest echelon appropriate. Target completion: Services complete by 1 October 2018; low risk; no new costs; OPR: DASD(MPP). Projected non-deployable decrease ~350.¹
6. Decrease DoD standard for end-to-end processing time in IDES from 295 days to 230 days. Target completion: 1 March 2018 (Services achieve by 1 March 2019); medium risk; requires business process change; OPR: DASD(HSP&O). Projected non-deployable decrease ~1,000. Requires Department of Veterans Affairs coordination.
7. Request additional top-line budget authorization and end strength to account for permanent medically non-deployable population in IDES. Target completion: 1-October-2020, high risk; \$1.7B for one year/\$7.9B FYDP (2020-2024); OPR: ASD(M&RA). Projected deployable increase of ~ 21,000. Allows Services to recruit, train, and retain additional Service members to replace permanently non-deployable Service members. Requires authorization and appropriation. Requires Deputy Secretary of Defense approval.
8. Explore new construct for DES. Target completion: Report by 1 May 2019; cost/savings TBD; OPR: DASD(MPP). Requires DASD(HSP&O) and Department of Veterans Affairs coordination. Potentially requires legislation and a Deputy Secretary of Defense decision after the completion of the review of the entire DES system.

Civilian Personnel Policies (Talent Management)

The Civilian Personnel Policies WG reviewed the current status of the civilian population to determine if the Department of Defense (DoD) has the right people with the right technical/functional competencies to perform their required duties and address complex and evolving requirements. Additionally, the WG looked at civilian workforce planning and management to determine if it was aligned properly with DoD's current as well as anticipated strategies and mission requirements; and whether civilian workforce competencies being developed match current and future requirements. Finally, the WG addressed ways to meet the DoD's immediate needs for mission-critical skills.

¹ Service members non-deployable for 12 consecutive months will be processed for separation using already established policies and authorities: for medical non-deployable Service member, they will be referred to the Disability Evaluation System covered in DoDI 1332.18 and for other non-deployable Service members, they will be processed in accordance with DoD Instruction 1332.14, "Enlisted Administrative Separations," or DoD Instruction 1332.30, "Separation of Regular and Reserve Commissioned Officers."

To address these challenges, the WG reviewed the Department's 21 Functional Communities (FCs) for its more than 600 civilian occupations established in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 1991. Employees are assigned to an FC based on their occupational series codes, which are defined by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Appropriately tapping into these FCs form the basis of many of the WGs' recommendations to improve the ability of the Department to hire effectively and efficiency and assess civilian management practices.

The roles of the FCs include: (1) defining the relevant competencies their members should possess; (2) establishing competency levels (e.g., apprentice, intermediate, expert); (3) assessing competency gaps through testing as well as evaluation; and (4) overseeing programs to address gaps through recruitment, training, and development programs targeted at mission needs.

Recommended Actions:

9. Conduct quarterly, data-driven "HRStat" performance reviews of progress on executing DoD's FY 2018-2019 Human Capital Operating Plan (HCOP). Implement pilot projects by 1 December 2017; low risk; no additional cost; OPR: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy (DASD(CPP)). This will include goals to reduce overall average time to hire (106 to 85 days) and specific time to hire metrics for critical occupations (Information Technology (IT)/Cyber from 107 to 85, Intel 118 to 95, Security 104 to 85), and to increase usage of special hiring authorities and flexibilities by at least 10 percent per year above FY 2017 baselines.

10. Benchmark selected FCs (Intelligence, IT/Cyber, Medical, and Human Resources), consistent with the law of war, against lessons learned and best practices in Acquisition Workforce, Engineering (Non-Construction), and Financial Management FCs. Implement pilot projects by January 31, 2018; low risk; no additional cost; OPR: DASD(CPP) and Functional Community Managers. This will establish a maturity model to define levels of development for FCs.

11. Develop a set of flexible civilian personnel policies and necessary authorities to increase the use of government civilians in meeting the growing demand for operators of remotely piloted systems. Implement agreed-upon joint Workforce Rationalization Plan (WRP) pilot project by June 30, 2018; low risk; no additional cost. OPR: DASD(CPP); OCR: Director, Total Force Manpower and Resources (TFM&RS).

12. Propose FY 2019 NDAA provisions that allow necessary corrections and improvements be made to previously granted HR authorities and flexibilities. Draft legislative proposals for delivery to Congress no later than March 1, 2018; low risk; no additional cost. OPR: DASD(CPP); OCR: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs (ASD(LA)).

Mandatory Training Working Group

The Mandatory Training WG conducted an assessment of current Common Military Training (CMT); directed by executive orders, legislation, and DoD policies. Their mission was to determine if CMT required Service members to train on subjects and topics that do not directly support and, may in fact impede, core task training.

The WG reviewed the current state of CMT within the Services and several recent studies and reports, including the 2016 and 2017 Government Accountability Office (GAO) studies and the NDAA for FY 2017 report on non-combat training. In 2017, the Department also established the Common Military Training Working Group (CMTWG) consisting of representatives from

the Military Departments, Joint Staff, and CMT Lead proponents. The CMTWG is a forum to review, standardize, and provide oversight of CMT requirements. The goal of the CMTWG is to combine, reduce, and eliminate redundant or obsolete CMT tasks and curriculum, and to provide unified direction and leadership to effectively and efficiently manage CMT requirements. These combined efforts demonstrated a significant reduction in overall CMT across the department.

Although the CMT requirements are much leaner than before, there is still room for improvement. WG recommendations standardize policies and requirements to focus on outcomes and eliminate non-essential training. Two CMT requirements in particular, Combatting Trafficking in Persons and Records Management, were identified as impeding core task training.

Recommended Actions:

13. Develop learning outcome based requirements that concisely articulate the expected learning outcome (“the what”). Target completion: February 1, 2018; low risk; no cost. OPR: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Training and Education (DASD(FE&T)).

14. Determine the program of instruction, frequency, reporting, and method of delivery (“the how”) at the Military Service level. Target completion: April 1, 2018; low risk; no cost. OPR: DASD(FE&T); OCR: Military Departments and the CMTWG. Recommendation requires DSD approval because the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) currently determines the frequency, reporting and method of delivery.

15. Coordinate curricula through the CMTWG to ensure compliance with learning objectives, outcomes and Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1322.31, “Common Military Training (CMT).” Implement: June 1, 2018; low risk; no cost. OPR: DASD(FE&T); OCR: Military Departments and the CMTWG.

16. Reduce the requirements of Combatting Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) (to within one year of initial entry) and Records Management (to initial entry with follow-on training determined by the Military Departments). Target completion: 1 April 2018; high risk; no cost. OPR: DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) and Defense Human Resources Activity (DHRA); OCR: Military Departments. Requires congressional engagement. Recommendation requires DSD approval due to coordination requirements with the Department of Justice and Congress by DHRA and because DoD CIO is the OSD Lead Proponent for records management and currently determines the frequency, reporting and method of training delivery.

17. Identify additional reductions in non-core military training and activities that adversely affect time for core task training. Target completion: August 1, 2018; medium risk; cost TBD. OPR: OUSD(P&R); OCR: Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and the Military Departments.

18. Update various issuances and external mandates (legislation, public law, federal regulations, etc.). Target completion: June 1, 2019; high risk; no cost. OPR: DASD(FE&T).

Strategic Thinking and Professional Military Education Development Working Group

The Strategic Thinking WG reviewed Professional Military Education (PME) with the goal of regaining a concentration on the art and science of warfighting, as well as finding a way to develop strategic competencies/strategic thinkers. The task was scoped to concentrate on the Joint PME (JPME) education, as delivered by the in-residence senior Service schools (war colleges) courses, and the JPME 10-week course taught at the Joint and Combined Warfighting School. The task was further refined to examine if and how the current PME program supports

the development of high level strategic thinkers who also possess the cognitive capability and intuition that can generate insights and collaboration to meet strategic challenges and articulate comprehensive, actionable solutions. The WG defined strategic thinkers as “theoretical strategists” (large scope thinkers) and “applied strategists” (problem solvers); as opposed to strategic planners. Data provided to the WG indicates that, currently, the Services and Joint Staff strategic programs have a strong focus on tactical and operational excellence, uniformity, and planning. These areas do not necessarily correlate with the development of strategic thinkers. The WG recommendations establish formal requirements (billets) across the Department, identify potential candidates for these positions, establish training and education, and manage the pool of candidates.

Recommended Actions:

19. Publish definition of strategic thinkers. Target completion: January 1, 2018; low risk; no additional cost; OPR: DASD(FE&T).
20. Identify superior intellectual talent resident in the force. Target completion: December 1, 2018; low risk; no additional cost; OPR: Military Departments.
21. Create strategic thinker demand by coding billets and only assigning officers possessing advanced strategic competencies. Target completion: June 1, 2018; low risk; cost TBD; OPR: Military Departments and Combatant Commands (COCOMs).
22. Develop innovative approaches to talent management and education to enhance the joint force. Target completion: December 1, 2018; low risk; no additional cost; OPR: Joint Staff (J7) and Joint Leader Development Council (JLDC).
23. Manage career progression of strategic thinkers. Target completion: December 1, 2018; medium risk; no additional cost; OPR: Military Departments.
24. Establish strategic thinker master’s program based on the original Art of War Program (small, exclusive, ~8 students). Target completion: August 1, 2018; low risk; cost \$600-900K/year; student billets funded through existing JPME quotas (~2 per Service); OPR: DASD(FE&T); OCR: Joint Staff (J7).
25. Review Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) for a more focused approach on warfighting to ensure curricula support global operations. Target completion: December 1, 2018; low risk; no additional cost; OPR: Joint Staff (J7).

Strengthening DoD Counterintelligence Working Group

The CI WG, established by USD(I), evaluated how to foster more effective CI support within the Department. The WG determined that DoD’s CI force experiences shortfalls in desired effectiveness based on an inability to act as an enterprise in response to CI threats from adversaries who employ whole-of-government strategies aligned to erode U.S. technological and military advantages. This lack of an enterprise approach manifests in multiple challenges including ineffective decentralized Screening and Vetting (SaV) missions conducted with diverted CI manpower, a lack of common information systems to enable effective CI activities, cumbersome or non-existent governance to focus CI activities and investments, loss of skilled polygraph personnel through pay inequities, and a high “tooth-to-tail” ratio that drains scarce manpower away from critical tasks. There is a classified report that accompanies the WG’s findings.

Recommended Actions:

26. Discontinue reliance on CI agents for vetting non-citizen accessions by establishing a dedicated screening and vetting capability. Implement by 1 June 2018; medium risk; no cost; OPR: USD(I). Implementation will bring cost savings to DoD, reducing manpower required by 1/6th of current. Centralizing this function will also decrease CI risk while realizing a cost savings and increasing analytical capability for all SaV missions. Requires Deputy Secretary of Defense approval.
27. Accelerate and update 2013 DoD CI strategy and develop CI campaigns against primary adversaries. Target completion: 1 October 2018. Complete 4 campaign plans against primary adversaries. Target completion: 1 December 2018; low risk, no cost; OPR: USD(I). Efforts already underway which will close gaps and ensure unity of effort.
28. Align Resources to Priorities. To ensure alignment to updated strategy and campaigns, and to increase “Tooth to Tail Ratio,” conduct major issue study of all CI resources cross walked with CI requirements. Target completion: 1 December 2018; low risk; no cost, OPR: USD(I). Results will inform the Department where its gaps are to help guide further investment, particularly in areas where investment would bring cross-service benefit.
29. Apply Strategic Leadership. Implement a CI strategy and campaign synchronization group to synchronize CI activities and investments while pursuing a unified strategy, with particular focus on CI issues with cross-organizational impact. Implement by 1 January 2018; low risk; no cost; OPR: USD(I). Chaired by USD(I) with membership including DIA Director, applicable Service and Joint Staff three-star representatives.
30. Invest in common information systems for the CI community that ensure the efficient and modern leveraging and sharing of data. Implement 1 January 2018; medium risk; cost TBD (relatively low cost investment will return big improvement); OPR: USD(I).
31. Stem the loss of critical, highly skilled polygraphers. Implement 1 January 2018; low risk; low cost, cost savings when considering fewer re-hiring actions; OPR: USD(I).

Way Forward

The original tasking memorandum from the Secretary of Defense directed USD(P&R) to review Departmental personnel policies to ensure they enhance the readiness and lethality of the Force. The WGs will remain empaneled beyond December 1, 2017, to ensure that all the recommendations in this report are successfully implemented and to continue to identify other personnel policy issues for review. In fact, other areas for review were suggested by leaders in the Department to include Service-level mandatory training and additional civilian personnel policies beyond hiring. Therefore, the WGs will continue collaborating with stakeholders across the Department and update senior leadership on the implementation progress and new efforts to enhance readiness and lethality.

CONSOLIDATED RECOMMENDATIONS

Military Personnel Policy						
	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>RISK</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>OPR</u>	<u>AUTHORITY</u>
1	Standardize reporting requirements.	Complete	Low	None	DASD(MPP)	
2	Establish universal retention policy on personnel deployability.	5-Jan-18	Low	System Modification	DASD(MPP)	Requires DSD approval of Policy Memo.
3	Establish DoD-wide medical retention standards; develop guidelines to accelerate medical separation processing given certain conditions.	1-Jul-19	Low	None	DASD(HSP&O)	
4	Raise individual medical readiness goal for the Active and Reserve personnel from 85% to 90%.	1-Feb-18	Low	None	DASD(HRP&O)	
5	Review (MilDep) administrative separation approval authority to ensure it is at the lowest echelon appropriate.	1-Oct-18	Low	None	DASD(MPP)	
6	Decrease DoD standard for processing time in IDES from 295 days to 230 days.	1-Mar-19	Medium	N/A	DASD(HSP&O)	Requires VA coordination.
7	Request additional top-line budget authorization and end strength to account for permanent medically non-deployable population in IDES.	1-Oct-20	High	\$1.7B (per year)/ \$7.9B (2020-2024)	ASD(M&RA)	Requires DSD approval.
8	Explore new construct for IDES.	1-May-19	High	TBD	DASD(HSP&O)	Requires VA coordination. Requires DSD approval.

Civilian Personnel Policy						
	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>RISK</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>OPR</u>	<u>AUTHORITY</u>
9	Execute FY 2018-2019 HCOP.	1-Dec-17	Low	None	DASD(CPP)	Execute FY 2018-2019 HCOP.
10	Benchmark selected FCs against lessons learned and best practices in Acquisition and Financial Management FCs to establish a maturity model.	31-Jan-18	Low	None	DASD(CPP)	
11	Develop flexible and adaptive civilian personnel policies, consistent with the law of war, and authorities to increase the use of government civilians in meeting growing demand for operators of remotely piloted systems.	30-Jun-18	Low	None	DASD(CPP)	
12	Propose FY 2019 NDAA provisions that allow necessary corrections and improvements to HR authorities and flexibilities.	1-Mar-18	Low	None	DASD(CPP)	

Mandatory Training

Mandatory Training						
RECOMMENDATION	DATE	RISK	COST	OPR	AUTHORITY	
13	Develop learning outcome based requirements that articulate the expected learning outcome (“the what”).	1-Feb-18	Low	None	DASD(FE&T)	
14	Delegate “the how” of CMT to the Military Departments (the program of instruction, frequency).	1-Apr-18	Low	None	DASD(FE&T)	Requires DSD approval.
15	Coordinate curricula through CMTWG.	1-Jun-18	Low	None	DASD(FE&T)	
16	Reduce the requirements of CTIP and Records Management.	1-Apr-18	High	None	DoD CIO, DHRA, and Military Departments	Requires congressional engagement. Requires DSD approval.
17	Identify additional reductions in non-core military training and activities.	1-Aug-18	Medium	TBD	OUSD(P&R), CAPE, and Military Departments	
18	Update various issuances and external mandates.	1-Jun-19	High	None	DASD(FE&T)	

Strategic Thinking and Professional Military Education Development

Strategic Thinking and Professional Military Education Development						
RECOMMENDATION	DATE	RISK	COST	OPR	AUTHORITY	
19	Define strategic thinkers.	1-Jan-18	Low	None	DASD(FE&T)	
20	Identify superior intellectual talent resident in the force.	1-Dec-18	Low	None	Military Departments	
21	Create strategic thinker demand by coding billets and assigning officers possessing strategic competencies.	1-Jun-18	Low	None	Military Departments and COCOMs	
22	Develop innovative approaches to talent management and education to enhance the joint force.	1-Dec-18	Low	None	Joint Staff (J7) and JLDC	
23	Manage career progression of strategic thinkers.	1-Dec-18	Medium	None	Military Departments	
24	Establish strategic thinker master’s program based on original Art of War Program.	1-Aug-18	Low	\$600-900K/year	DASD(FE&T) and Joint Staff (J7)	
25	Review OPMEP for a more focused approach on warfighting to ensure curricula support global operations.	1-Dec-18	Low	None	Joint Staff (J7)	

Strengthening DoD Counterintelligence

Strengthening DoD Counterintelligence						
RECOMMENDATION	DATE	RISK	COST	OPR	AUTHORITY	
26	Discontinue reliance on CI agents for vetting non-citizen accessions by establishing a dedicated screening and vetting capability.	1-Jun-18	Medium	COST SAVINGS	USD(I)	Requires DSD approval.
27	Accelerate and update 2013 DoD CI strategy and develop CI campaigns against primary adversaries.	1-Dec-18	Medium	None	USD(I)	

28	Align Resources to Priorities through Major Issue Study.	1-Dec-18	Low	None	USD(I)	
29	Apply Strategic Leadership through Senior CI Strategy and Campaign Sync Group.	1-Jan-18	Low	None	USD(I)	
30	Invest in common information systems	1-Jan-18	Low	TBD	USD(I)	
31	Stem the loss of critical, highly skilled polygraphers.	1-Jan-18	Medium	Low Cost	USD(I)	

Military Personnel Policies Working Group

Introduction:

USD(P&R) tasked DASD(MPP) to review military personnel policies to enhance readiness and lethality of the All-Volunteer Force. Specifically, the Military Personnel Policies WG addressed the non-deployable Service member populations with the initial question, “How can we reduce the permanent non-deployable population?” We refined this question to include all Military Service personnel (Active, National Guard, and Reserve) and to address the temporary and permanent non-deployable populations.

The WG conducted an assessment of the Military Departments’ non-deployable populations to establish standard reporting criteria, to identify non-deployability categories, and to recommend potential policy and/or legislative changes that would result in a reduced non-deployable population and improve personnel readiness across the force. It was clear that a large population of non-deployable Service members have an adverse impact on the warfighting readiness and the lethality of the force. The WG reviewed personnel policies relating to non-deployable Service members to determine and recommend the best possible military personnel policies that maximize the deployability and readiness of the force.

To accomplish this task, the DASD(MPP) established a WG consisting of representatives of Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA(M&A)), Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASN(M&RA)), Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Army G1, Navy N1, Air Force A1, Marine Corps (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Joint Staff J1, National Guard Bureau (NGB) (J1 & J8), Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, CAPE, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness (ASD(R)), and ASD(M&RA).

Background:

The absence of a DoD-wide policy to address non-deployability resulted in each of the Services reporting its non-deployable population, based on internal Service policies and applying existing DoD-level policies where appropriate.² This lack of guidance and consistency on reporting non-deployable Service members across the Department served to guide the WG in its objective of reducing the Active and Reserve personnel non-deployable population. To accomplish its objective, the WG identified three tasks:

1. Conduct an assessment of the Services’ non-deployable populations to determine the scope of the non-deployable population within the Department.
2. Refine reporting to provide a consistent view of nondeployables for future reporting.
3. Recommend personnel policy and/or legislative changes relating to non-deployability to enable the Military Departments to maximize the deployability and readiness of Active and Reserve personnel.

Discussion:

The latest non-deployable report (based on data as of August 31, 2017) identified both temporary and permanent non-deployable personnel, which constitute 23.7 percent of the Total

² For example, DoD Instruction (DoDI) 6025.19, “Individual Medical Readiness (IMR),” provides specific DoD policy on the administration of the IMR Program, but does not address deployability from other than the medical readiness perspective.

DoD Population (Figure 1). While this number appears high, when broken down into the temporary and permanent non-deployable categories, the size is more easily explained.




Figure 1

Temporary Non-deployable Population:

The total temporary non-deployable population, which includes trainees & transients, medical, legal and administrative (Figure 2) represents nearly 22.3 percent (471,109) of total DoD strength (A breakdown by Service is quantified in ANNEX, Table 1). Trainees³ and transients⁴ make up the largest portion of the total temporary non-deployable population (48.2 percent) and comprise 10.8 percent of the Active and Reserve personnel strength. The Service members in this population represent the “overhead” necessary for Service management of personnel and are viewed as an investment in capabilities and future readiness (with some capacity for deployables in crisis or contingency). While the trainee population will fluctuate throughout the year in conjunction with the Services’ accession and entry-level training profiles, further efficiencies within the Services’ training pipelines may marginally reduce this number. The WG examined the size of each Services’ trainee and transient populations over a 10-year period (2007-2016) to determine the normal range for each Service. All are currently within their 10-year average.

³ Trainees includes: active duty military personnel who have not completed initial entry training; students in formal courses of instruction attended after arrival at a Service member’s first permanent duty assignment; cadets/midshipmen at the Military Service academies; and all in-transit time from entry on active duty until completion of the last initial entry-level training or course. It does not include Reserve Component personnel temporarily on active duty for recruit or other training.

⁴ Transients include military personnel in a travel, proceed, leave enroute, or temporary duty enroute status on permanent PCS orders to execute an accession, separation, training, operational, or rotational move; transients do not include military personnel on temporary duty for training between permanent duty stations or are moving between entry level courses.




Figure 2

The remainder of the temporary non-deployable population includes Service members who are counted as non-deployable for medical⁵, legal⁶, or administrative⁷ reasons, but whose status can be resolved to allow the Service members to deploy. These categories account for 11.6 percent of the Active and Reserve personnel strength.

The medical category (ANNEX, Table 2) accounts for 84.8 percent of the temporary non-deployable population (243,944). There is potential for improvement within this category, which is comprised of non-deployable Service members, in three sub-categories:

1. Limited Duty includes Service members categorized as non-deployable for various Service-defined medical restrictions. This population (90,985) may be difficult to reduce through policy change alone; however, leadership involvement, stricter adherence to procedures, and integration of risk management may reduce the number of limited duty cases. Additionally, the WG believes there are Service members spending significant periods of their service contracts in a limited duty status who could potentially be separated through DES⁸ based on a medical disability that renders the Service member non-deployable.

⁵ The medical category is comprised of Service members who: (1) do not meet IMR standards, (2) are pregnant or post-partum, (3) have a duty limiting condition, or (4) are entered into the IDES (Army reports these Service members are permanently non-deployable).

⁶ The legal category includes those Service members who are: (1) pending civilian or military court action, (2) under investigation, (3) under arrest or confined, (4) pending administrative discharge or separation, or (5) serving as material witnesses

⁷ The administrative category includes those Service members who are: (1) Absent Without Leave or Unauthorized Absence (AWOL/UA), (2) conscientious objectors, (3) sole survivors, (4) unable to carry a firearm, (5) on a humanitarian duty assignment, or (6) designated as non-deployable for Service-specific categories such as physical fitness assessment failure (Navy), lack of a family care plan (Army), or commander's hold (Air Force).

⁸ Unless otherwise specified, DES includes the Integrated Disability Evaluation System and/or the Legacy Disability Evaluation System.

2. Preventive Medicine/Individual Medical Readiness (IMR) requirements⁹ (dental readiness and periodic health assessment) make up a large portion of this population (99,626). A review of these requirements showed that the Services are meeting or exceeding the current DoD IMR Active and Reserve personnel medically ready goal (85 percent) as established by ASD(HA) in accordance with DoDI 6025.19, “Individual Medical Readiness (IMR).”

3. Pregnancy includes service women designated as non-deployable while post-partum (which has differing lengths based on Service¹⁰).

The remaining categories, legal and administrative, include those service members unable to deploy due to primarily administrative circumstances; reasons vary by Service. Examples include: service members pending administrative separation, awaiting military or civil court action, pending investigation, physical fitness assessment failures (Navy), humanitarian assignments, commander’s hold (Air Force) and age restrictions.

Permanent Non-Deployable Population:

The permanent non-deployable population (Figure 3), represents nearly 1.4 percent (29,323) of the total DoD strength and consists primarily of service members pending medical separation (68 percent), those retained with deployment limiting condition (12 percent), and those who are awaiting separation or retirement (20 percent) (A breakdown by Service is also provided in ANNEX, Table 3). These are Service members who will not return to a deployable status. Most of the service members in this group who are pending medical separation enter into the IDES and are ultimately separated from the Service upon final adjudications of their cases.¹¹ There are currently 3,707 Service members who have been retained with deployment-limiting conditions.¹²

⁹ The six IMR elements established in DoD Instruction 6025.19, are: (1) Periodic Health Assessment (PHA), (2) deployment-limiting medical and dental conditions, (3) dental assessment, (4) immunization status, (5) medical readiness and laboratory studies, and (6) individual medical equipment (glasses and gas mask inserts).

¹⁰ The Army places female Soldiers in a non-deployable status for 6 months post-partum. The other Services allow a 12-month post-partum exemption from deployment.

¹¹ Reporting differences exist between the Services on the population of Service members entered into IDES. The Army categorizes Soldiers who have entered the IDES as permanently non-deployable and the other Services currently do not.

¹² DoDI, 1332.18, “Disability Evaluation System (DES),” prevents the Secretary of a Military Department from authorizing involuntary administrative separation of a member based on a determination that the member is unsuitable for deployment or worldwide assignment after a PEB has found the member fit for the same medical condition.




Figure 3

The WG focused heavily on examining the IDES process¹³ and identified the significantly shorter periods Service members are spending in the IDES process—well below the DoD targets¹⁴ in 2007. The WG’s assessment is that the IDES provides the Services a more effective method to determine fitness for duty and, where warranted, disability ratings for their members. By reducing disability time goals, adjusting staffing, and increasing senior leader focus on accelerating evaluation of disabled Service members, the IDES process can be made even more efficient, lead to a reduced non-deployable inventory, and improve personnel readiness.

The WG also discussed the possibility of requesting legislative authority (with funding) to establish a category of end strength accounting, consisting of Service members in the formal IDES process and considered “in transition.” These Service members would result in an increase in the NDAA end strength authorization and remain on active duty until final disability determination and are transferred to VA. This authority would allow the Services to “replace” members “in transition” with others who are capable of world-wide deployment.¹⁵

¹³ The IDES includes both the Medical Evaluation Board (MEB) and the Physical Evaluation Board (PEB). The PEB process determines a Service member’s fitness for duty.

¹⁴ DoD policy requires the Military Departments to complete disability evaluation for 80% of Service members in the IDES process in an average of 295 days for Active Component (AC) Service members and 305 days for Reserve Component (RC) Service members. The 295-day process includes 30 days of VA benefits activity after discharge.

¹⁵ Comptroller estimate of cost would be approximately \$1.7B per full-year, totaling \$7.9B over the FY20-24 FYDP using current non-deployable populations, applying a 12.9% reduction (the projected drop in the IDES inventory by FY23). Assumptions also included that it would take two years to grow the full strength increase. Costs included pay and allowances based on Military Personnel FYDP rates the Services provided to CAPE for the Program Objective Memorandum-19 submission to the projected average strength. The latest Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Accrual Rates were applied to the projected average strength, as was the current Defense Health Program Active Duty acceleration factor used in the annual Standard Military Composite Rates used when preparing the Active Components average strength.

Findings:

With regard to readiness, any amount of permanently non-deployable Service members is undesirable. The WG found that the current size of the permanent and temporary non-deployable populations are not significantly detrimental to the overall readiness of the force. However, there are areas where a standardized DoD policy, additional command influence, and greater efficiencies could reduce the non-deployable population and thereby improve personnel readiness across the total force.

After three months of analyzing the non-deployable population across the Department and the issues and policies that contribute to its size, the WG determined there is no “silver bullet” that will reduce large numbers of non-deployables. With an Active and Reserve personnel of over 2.1 million Service members, the Department will always have some portion of its personnel unavailable or incapable of world-wide deployment. However, all Service members are expected to be able to deploy. Additionally, the WG concluded that efforts to reduce the size of non-deployable population will require additional command emphasis at all levels and greater individual accountability for personal readiness by all Service members—which will ultimately foster a culture of readiness across the Department.

Recommended Actions:

1. Standardize reporting requirements. Completed; low risk; no new costs; OPR: DASD(MPP).
2. Establish universal retention policy on personnel deployability. Greater than 12 months of non-deployability will result in mandatory processing for separation. Target completion: 5 January 2018; low risk; requires system modification; OPR: DASD(MPP). Policy memorandum requires DSD signature.
3. Establish DoD-wide medical retention standards; develop guidelines to accelerate fitness evaluation for medical separation given certain conditions (pre-Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES)). Target completion: 1 July 2019; low risk; no new costs; OPR: DASD(HSP&O). Projected non-deployable decrease ~7,500.
4. Raise individual medical readiness goal for Active and Reserve personnel from 85 percent to 90 percent; reassess after 12 months. Target completion: 1 February 2018 (Services achieve by 1 February 2019); low risk; no new costs; OPR: DASD(HRP&O). Projected non-deployable decrease ~4500.
5. Review (MilDep) administrative separation approval authority to ensure it is at the lowest echelon appropriate. Target completion: Services complete by 1 October 2018; low risk; no new costs; OPR: DASD(MPP). Projected non-deployable decrease ~350.
6. Decrease DoD standard for end-to-end processing time in IDES from 295 days to 230 days. Target completion: 1 March 2018 (Services achieve by 1 March 2019); medium risk; requires business process change; OPR: DASD(HSP&O). Projected non-deployable decrease ~1,000. Requires Department of Veterans Affairs coordination.
7. Request additional top-line budget authorization and end strength to account for permanent medically non-deployable population in IDES. Target completion: FY 2020, high risk; \$1.7B for one year/\$7.9B FYDP (2020-2024); OPR: ASD(M&RA). Projected deployable increase of ~21,000. Allows Services to recruit, train, and retain additional Service members to replace permanently non-deployable Service members. Requires authorization and appropriation. Requires Deputy Secretary of Defense approval.

8. Explore new construct for DES. Target completion: Report by 1 May 2019; cost/savings TBD; OPR: DASD(MPP). Requires DASD(HSP&O) and Department of Veterans Affairs coordination. Potentially requires legislation and a Deputy Secretary of Defense decision after the completion of the DES review.

Conclusion:

After a thorough analysis of the Department's Active and Reserve personnel non-deployable population, the WG has determined that a DoD-wide policy addressing non-deployability is necessary to reduce the number of non-deployable Service members and to improve overall personnel readiness. The WG proposes several recommendations to reduce DoD's non-deployable population that place a shared responsibility for personnel readiness on both the individual Service members and the commands in which they serve. Requiring routine reporting by the Services, establishing universal retention standards for non-deployable personnel, placing greater accountability on individual medical readiness, and pursuing additional efficiencies in the IDES will result in a decrease in the non-deployable population and an increase in overall personnel readiness across the force.

Civilian Personnel Policies Working Group

Introduction:

DASD(CPP) was tasked by USD(P&R) and the Secretary of Defense to “review hiring practices for the civilian workforce.” The WG studied reports and research from numerous government and non-government sources.

The WG worked to answer the initial question, “Do we have the right people with the right technical and functional competencies to perform their required duties and address complex and evolving requirements?” The Military Departments answered, “Generally yes, but we have challenges: rapidly changing technology, hiring, and budget. We’re also concerned about attracting millennials and changing the bureaucratic culture.” The WG expounded upon the idea that the answer might be “yes” or “no.” Neither answer can be confirmed because we lack systems and data to define and assess competencies, close skill gaps, and strategically manage civilian workforce. This insight established additional questions to answer: Is civilian workforce planning and management aligned properly with DoD’s current and anticipated strategies and mission requirements? Are civilian workforce competencies being developed to match current and future requirements? What are we doing about Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) immediate needs for mission-critical skills?

The WG consisted of members of the DoD Civilian Personnel Policy Council (CPPC), chaired by the DASD(CPP), representing civilian personnel leaders from the Military Departments, Joint Staff J1, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, the Defense Intelligence Community, and other defense agencies and field activities represented by the HR Director, Washington Headquarters Services. The Director, TFM&RS also participated in the CPP WG. The CPPC’s vice chair, the Director, Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service, provided staff support, including leading subordinate WGs of DoD Component representatives.

Background:

DoD’s civilian workforce exceeds 900,000 employees. DoD civilian pay and benefits are estimated at \$70 billion in FY 2017, about 14 percent of DoD’s base budget. DoD will hire, on average, about 70,000 new civilian employees per year, or about 8 percent of the workforce (ANNEX Tables 4-7). Managing the DoD civilian workforce more effectively and efficiently could conserve both financial and human resources, help managers make better workforce mix decisions, and promote an engaged civilian workforce that performs at its highest potential to advance the most important work of the DoD enterprise. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report, “Replacing Military Personnel in Support Positions with Civilian Employees” (December 2, 2015) found that in 2012 about 340,000 active-duty military personnel were assigned to support-function positions that could be performed by civilian employees. CBO estimated that transferring 80,000 such positions to civilian personnel could reduce costs by \$3.1 billion to \$5.7 billion per year, which could be either saved or redirected to higher spending priorities. See also CBO “Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2017 to 2026” (December 8, 2016).

The DoD civilian workforce contributes to readiness and lethality not only by providing non-military support and services, but also by participating directly in defense missions such as intelligence and cybersecurity; developing, delivering, and sustaining technologically advanced warfighting systems; and by providing close mission support where appropriate in areas such as security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and civic aid. Improving business practices to promote strategic management and development of the civilian workforce will give

the Department greater flexibility to choose the most effective and efficient labor source option to meet complex, evolving mission needs.

Discussion:

The current civilian workforce generally meets today's needs, but concerns about the development and sustainment of a workforce capable of meeting future requirements exist. The WG acknowledged new hiring flexibilities are helpful, but limited. The WG also noted that those flexibilities do not fully address issues associated with recruiting for modern, highly technical occupations, including the ability to offer competitive salary levels. They see challenges in keeping pace with changing technology given the resources and flexibilities available in the current public sector when compared to private industry. They cited resource constraints and fiscal uncertainty, including General Schedule and Senior Executive Service personnel cuts and limited investment in both technical and leadership training, as well as concerns about meeting future HR IT needs. They expressed concerns with the difficulty of attracting candidates to what they may perceive to be an antiquated federal personnel system within a bureaucratic culture that resists change.

An effective program for HR policy development, execution, and implementation is a critical element of overall workforce management and future readiness of the force. Ineffective hiring policies result in hiring delays, which create burdens for coworkers who inherit extra work, for which they may not be well qualified. Unless managed properly, gaps in manning negatively impact program and project continuity, progress, and knowledge management. Poorly conceived or unnecessarily complex hiring policies create barriers and delays for hiring managers. Civilian staffing gaps often result in misallocation of resources, as organizations may substitute higher-cost contractors or military personnel to perform work that would be performed more efficiently by civilian federal employees. A fully manned and agile workforce is a fundamental component of military readiness. The inability to execute recruitment efficiently and effectively degrades our military's readiness and diminishes the Department's lethality.

Unlike the military (with well-organized occupational communities, robust training tied to mission requirements, well-established rank structures, and "up-or-out" retention policies), the federal civilian workforce is not similarly organized or resourced to define, assess, and develop technical or general work competencies. In 2001, GAO designated Strategic Human Capital Management – specifically the agencies' ability to close skills gaps in mission-critical occupations – as a government-wide "High Risk."¹⁶ In June 2017, GAO identified DoD's strategic management of human capital as a key mission challenge and found that, while DoD has taken steps to develop better information about the skill sets possessed and needed in its workforce, DoD still needs to address skill gaps in critical elements of the workforce.¹⁷

In the past, federal agencies (including the DoD) have conducted operational strategic planning separately from human capital strategic planning. This caused lags and disconnects between "demand" signals for operational needs and "supply" responses in terms of civilian workforce planning and management (e.g., recruitment, hiring, compensation, training and development, assignments, performance) (ANNEX, Table 8). To address these problems, recent

¹⁶ Every two years at the start of a new Congress, GAO calls attention to agencies and program areas that are "High Risk" due to their vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are most in need of transformation. "High Risk" may result from either insufficient staffing or from the workforce's lack of appropriate skills or abilities to accomplish mission-critical work.

¹⁷ GAO, Department of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission Challenges, [GAO-17-369](#) (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2017).

changes were imposed under the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-352) and implementing regulations from OMB (OMB Circular A-11) and OPM (Subpart B of 5 C.F.R., Part 250). Under these new rules, starting with FY 2018, every federal agency must develop a HCOP coordinated with, and describing how the agency will execute the human capital elements of, its Agency Strategic Plan (ASP) and Annual Performance Plan.

Findings:

Based on past NDAA requirements and GAO recommendations, DoD established 21 FCs for its more than 600 civilian occupations. The Defense Acquisition Workforce, formally established by Congress in the NDAA for FY 1991, was the first professionalized FC. Employees are assigned to a FC based on their occupational series codes, which are defined by OPM, as shown in Figure 4.

DoD Functional Communities¹⁸			
Community	# of Occ Series	# of Civ	% of DoD Civ
Contracting/ Business Group / Quality Assurance ¹⁹	16	52,875	7.07%
Administrative Support	19	30,709	4.11%
Education	10	30,797	4.12%
Engineering (Non-Construction)	19	82,776	11.07%
Environmental Management	18	8,656	1.16%
Facility Engineering & Mgmt	152	59,539	7.96%
Financial Management	15	42,049	5.62%
Foreign Affairs	5	795	0.11%
Human Resources	7	22,941	3.07%
Information Technology	18	51,394	6.87%
Intelligence (non-classified only)	2	7,769	1.04%
Law Enforcement	12	16,448	2.20%
Legal	13	6,472	0.87%
Logistics	126	154,273	20.62%
Medical	51	46,605	6.23%
Mil Comm & Family Support	32	14,099	1.88%
Public Affairs	9	5,324	0.71%
Safety & Public Safety	14	13,868	1.85%
Science & Technology	47	15,575	2.08%

¹⁸ The Acquisition Functional Community, while not separately identified above, is cross-cutting across the communities listed above and represents more than 150 occupation series. The DoD acquisition workforce is comprised of 149,782 civilians and 15,493 military members. Section 101(a)(18) of title 10, U.S.C., defines the term “acquisition workforce” as the persons serving in acquisition positions within the Department of Defense, as designated pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1721(a). DoD’s DAWIA management of the workforce is function-based, rather than occupation series based. For the purposes of Figure 4 above, employees are assigned to a FC based on their occupational series codes, which are defined by OPM.

Security	2	10,315	1.38%
Misc Occ Series Holding Acct	50	74,722	9.99%
Total (as of 9/30/17):	637	748,001	100.00%
(Does not include civilian employees of non-appropriated fund activities)			

Figure 4

The role of the FCs include defining the relevant competencies their members should possess; establishing competency levels (e.g., apprentice, intermediate, expert); assessing competency gaps through testing and evaluation; and overseeing programs to address gaps through recruitment, training, and development programs targeted at mission needs. FC executives and managers are responsible for determining what competencies (knowledge, skills, abilities, experience and aptitudes) are needed for the community to meet present and future mission needs.

By law, OPM prescribes the rules and procedures for federal hiring that are designed to implement Merit Systems Principles (5 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2305). This law requires federal recruitment systems to be efficient, effective, fair, open to all citizens, unbiased, and non-discriminatory. OPM’s standard “Delegated Examining” (DE) competitive hiring process includes approximately 20 steps in the hiring process. Security clearance delays typically have the greatest impact on new hires. DoD’s average time to hire for DE new hires over the past 5 years has been approximately 130 days (ANNEX, Table 9).

To meet immediate critical skill needs, particularly in the areas of cyber and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM), DoD received 41 extensive special hiring authorities which are intended to make the hiring process faster and more flexible (ANNEX, Hiring Authorities, Incentives and Programs) including: 14 new expedited or direct hiring authorities (including cyber, Defense Acquisition Workforce, health care, financial management, various science and technology, and post-secondary students and recent graduates); 11 talent acquisition hiring incentives; nine non-traditional personnel programs (including STEM, intelligence, Defense Acquisition Workforce); three public-private talent exchanges, and four scholarship and fellowship authorities. DoD has expedited the issuance of supporting policies and will closely oversee the full implementation of these special authorities to ensure that they are fully accessible to, and used by, DoD hiring officials. The CPP WG executed a plan of action to ensure recent special hiring authorities and flexibilities, especially those related to STEM and cyber hiring, are useful for hiring managers and HR specialists in the field. This includes partnering with the Cyber Excepted Service under DoD CIO to expedite implementation of its new personnel system.

Effectively implementing and managing these new authorities and flexibilities helps address hiring process concerns, including “time to hire” and the ability to attract top candidates in competitive fields. One measure of hiring process concerns is the consistently low positive responses over an 8-year period (2010-2017) to the DoD Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey question, “My work unit is able to recruit people with the right skills.” (ANNEX, Table 10)

To support the Department’s complex civilian personnel requirements, CPP coordinated with the Strategic Planning Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) in the development of DoD’s ASP for FY 2018-22. The draft ASP was submitted to OMB, as required, by September 30, 2017. The DoD HCOP is based on the draft DoD ASP and was submitted to the OPM and OMB on November 30, 2017. The HCOP incorporates both general human capital issues (e.g., recruitment and workforce development, business improvements) and specific strategic human capital needs (e.g., information systems, cybersecurity, intelligence,

security cooperation capabilities) identified in the draft ASP. The HCOP adopts 12 human capital strategies, as shown in Figure 5, supported by a total of 23 specific initiatives and 70 metrics with milestones and targets for FY 2018 and FY 2019. OPM and OMB rules also require agencies to conduct periodic, data-driven performance reviews to track progress in achieving strategic goals. Starting in December 2017, DASD(CPP) will chair quarterly reviews (known as “HRStat”) with the CPPC to oversee and evaluate efforts toward achieving HCOP milestones and targets and to identify, implement, and monitor mid-course improvements. DoD’s FCs vary widely in size and scope. Some of these FCs are making considerable progress in fulfilling their responsibilities, while others are not.




Figure 5

DoD’s Functional Communities vary widely in size, scope and mission; therefore, the FC management approach varies from community to community. The FCs include 149,782 civilians and 15,493 military members. The Acquisition community, also known as the Defense Acquisition Workforce (AWF), is led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and Service Acquisition Executives. The community is governed by a Senior Steering Board (SSB) (and sub-Workforce Management Group), chaired by USD(AT&L) and with principal members (senior leaders) from the Services, major Agencies, and acquisition Functional Leaders. The SSB provides enterprise oversight and strategic direction for the Department-wide AWF. Enterprise-level goals to improve talent management and workforce capability are described in the DoD Acquisition Workforce Strategic Plan. These goals fully support the DoD priorities to improve talent management and make DoD an employer of choice. Each Functional Leader is supported by a standing functional team consisting of Service and Agency representative career management and subject matter experts. AT&L Human Capital Initiatives and the Defense Acquisition University participate on all functional

teams. Based on requirements and authority, the AWF is comprised of fifteen critical acquisition functions and corresponding acquisition communities (e.g., Program Management, Engineering, Contracting, Test and Evaluation, and Life Cycle Logistics), with each community having competency models and functional certification requirements (consisting of education, training and experience standards) which are defined by Levels 1, 2 and 3. Components assign certification requirements to each designated acquisition position. Workforce requirements defined by the Functional Leader and Components through competency assessments and the standing FIPT requirements process, are provided to the Defense Acquisition University which serves the entire AWF community with certification training and other performance support resources.

The Financial Management (FM) FC is a noteworthy example of a community that has achieved major goals in a short time. The FM community includes approximately 42,000 civilians and 11,000 military members. The leader of the FM community is the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). The FM FC developed a list of 24 competencies, which were adopted by the Federal Chief Financial Officer Council in 2015 for use across the federal government. These competencies serve as more specific and quantifiable job qualifications in place of traditional statements of knowledge, skills, and abilities. In addition, the FM community has completed an assessment of its workforce and is requiring employees to address identified skill gaps through individual training and development plans. The FM FC has shared their lessons learned with other FCs in an effort to promote successful ideas across the Department.

In addition to internal DoD collaboration, the CPP WG studied reports and research from numerous government and non-government sources (ANNEX, Outside Sources). The CPP WG met with representatives from the Center for a New American Security to help define the role of DoD civilians in enhancing lethality of the force. Additionally, the DASD(CPP) sponsored a seminar on October 13th for both DoD and other federal agency HR leaders to hear from proponents of government-wide HR regulatory reform, including the National Academy of Public Administration, the Partnership for Public Service, as well as leading scholars and commentators, to inform discussions about what additional HR authorities DoD might pursue.

Although HR IT systems are beyond the scope of the current inquiry, the CPP WG noted that strategic management of human capital to produce the right competencies to meet evolving missions depends on having access to accurate, reliable, complete, secure data, collected using common definitions and formats, which can be compared and analyzed using modern, interoperable systems.

Recommended Actions:

9. Conduct quarterly, data-driven “HRStat” performance reviews of progress on executing DoD’s FY 2018-2019 HCOP. Implement pilot projects by December 1, 2017; low risk; no additional cost; OPR: DASD(CPP). This will include goals to reduce overall average time to hire (106 to 85 days) and specific time to hire metrics for critical occupations (IT/Cyber from 107 to 85, Intelligence from 118 to 95, Security from 104 to 85), and to increase usage of hiring authorities and flexibilities by at least 10 percent per year above FY 2017 baselines.

10. Benchmark selected FCs (Intelligence, IT/Cyber, Medical, and HR) against lessons learned and best practices in Acquisition Workforce, Engineering (Non-Construction), and Financial Management FCs. Implement pilot projects by January 31, 2018; low risk; no additional cost;

OPR: DASD(CPP) and FC Managers. This will establish a maturity model to define levels of development for FCs.

11. Develop a set of flexible civilian personnel policies and necessary authorities, consistent with the law of war, to increase the use of government civilians in meeting the growing demand for operators of remotely piloted systems. Implement agreed-upon joint WRP pilot project by June 30, 2018; low risk; no additional cost. OPR: DASD(CPP); OCR: Director, TFM&RS.

12. Propose FY 2019 NDAA provisions that allow necessary corrections and improvements be made to previously granted HR authorities and flexibilities. Draft legislative proposals for approval by OMB and delivery to Congress no later than March 1, 2018; low risk; no additional cost. OPR: DASD(CPP); OCR: ASD(LA).

Conclusion:

The above recommendations will enhance DoD's ability, through competency-based strategic human capital management, to identify and prepare for emerging and evolving mission demands for specialized skills, particularly those that can be effectively and efficiently supplied by civilian employees. Through specific milestones, the HCOP provides a road map to achieve quantifiable enhancements in the civilian workforce's role in support of strategic goals and the readiness and lethality of the force. Improved civilian workforce planning and management will also promote the WRP by incentivizing managers – through proper alignment and optimization of statutes, policies, and business practices – to choose civilian personnel as a workforce solution when it is cost-effective, promotes readiness and lethality, and prevents undesirable outcomes (e.g., borrowed military manpower).

Mandatory Training Working Group

Introduction:

The Mandatory Training WG was established by DASD(FE&T) to determine if mandatory training impedes core task training and if so, to make recommendations that will reduce the CMT burden. It refined its task by answering the question, “Does current CMT directed by executive orders, legislation, and DoD policies (ANNEX, Table 11) require Service members to train on subjects and topics that do not directly support and, may in fact, impede core task training?”

The CMT WG was comprised of representatives from the Navy, Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, the Joint Staff J1 and J7, NGB, and OSD Lead Proponent representatives from USD(I), Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DoD CIO, DCMO, DHRA, ASD(R), and ASD(HA).

CMT is non-occupational directed training that sustains readiness, provides common knowledge, enhances awareness, reinforces expected behavioral standards or obligations and establishes a functional baseline that improves the effectiveness of DoD and its constituent organizations.¹⁸ CMT required training is to be conducted by all Service members regardless of grade. Core task training is training that directly relates to a Service member’s warfighting tasks.

Background:

In 2012, RAND’s National Defense Research Institute issued a report recommending options to standardize requirements and reduce the CMT burden.¹⁹ As a result of RAND’s efforts, in 2015 the Department published DoDI 1322.31, “Common Military Training (CMT),” with a subsequent update in 2017. DoDI 1322.31 provided the initial framework to address CMT growth and provide discipline to CMT mandates. In 2016, GAO collected and reviewed DoD and Service-level guidance to determine the training time required to complete CMT (ANNEX, Table 12) and the process for reviewing, validating, consolidating and eliminating CMT. In 2017, the GAO had no findings or recommendations, largely validating the Department’s and the Military Departments’ efforts to reduce the CMT burden.²⁰

The NDAA for FY 2017 required DoD to provide a report on non-combat training requirements for Service members. The report was completed in March 2017 and highlighted the successes of the Department and the Military Departments to reduce common, ancillary, and general military training requirements. In 2017, the Department also established the CMTWG consisting of representatives from the Military Departments, Joint Staff, and CMT Lead Proponents. The CMTWG is a forum to review, standardize, and provide oversight of CMT requirements. The goal of the CMTWG is to combine, reduce, and eliminate redundant or obsolete CMT tasks and curriculum, and to provide unified direction and leadership to effectively and efficiently manage CMT requirements.

Discussion:

Over the last four years, the Military Departments have reduced the time spent on CMT topics by over 50 percent by combining training, changing the method of delivery or extending the frequency. As a result, on average, CMT accounts for approximately 1 percent of an Active

¹⁸ DoDI 1322.31, “Common Military Training,” April 11, 2017

¹⁹ RAND NDRI: *General Military Training Standardization and Reduction Options*. 2012

²⁰ GAO report to Congress *DoD Has Taken Steps to Assess CMT*, May 2017

Component Service member’s available time (Figure 6). Service CMT reduction highlights include:

1. In FY 2017, the Army reduced the number of common mandatory training topics from 17 to 10, and improved commander flexibility.
2. In 2016, the Air Force eliminated 15 standalone training courses and streamlined or consolidated the remaining 16 courses.
3. Since FY 2014, the Navy has reduced the number of mandatory training topics from 23 to 10, while re-focusing on unit leadership empowerment and small group training by shifting primarily to face-to-face training delivery by command and deck-plate leaders.
4. Since 2015, the Marine Corps has reduced annual training requirements by over 12 hours by changing the frequency of training and consolidating classes.



Mandatory Training Time Requirement (Annualized if Applicable)

Program	OSD Frequency	Army	Army (RC)	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
Antiterrorism	Annual	1.25	.62	1	.5	.5
Combatting Trafficking in Persons	Annual	.75	.75	1	.5	.5
Counterintelligence Awareness and Reporting	Annual	1.5	.75	1	.5	.2
Cybersecurity	Annual	2	3	1 (going to 2)	.5	.2
Operations Security	Annual	1.5	1.5	1	1	.2
Privacy Act	Annual	.17	.17	1	.5	.2
Records Management	Annual	.17	.17	1	.5	.2
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response	Annual	1.5	1.5	1	1	.5
Sexual Harassment	Annual	1.5	1.5	.5	.5	.25
Suicide Prevention	Annual	.75	.75	1	.5	.5
Code of Conduct	As Required	1	1	.25	1	1
Military EO*	As Required	2	1	.5	.5	1
Substance Abuse*	As Required	.75	.75	.75	.5	.25
Service-Specific Mandatory Training		25	12.5	0	5.7	4.3
Financial Literacy	Touchpoints	In Development				
Medical Readiness	3 Years	In Development				
Transition Assistance	Transition					
Total Time Required		39.8	26.0	11.0	13.7	9.8

*All but the Navy conducts this training annually; Navy conducts either "as needed" or periodically / Air Force Substance Abuse training is given only to medical providers and commanders


Figure 6

Although CMT requirements are much leaner than before, there is still room for improvement. In particular, two CMT requirements were identified by the WG as impeding core task training: CTIP, mandated by the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 22; and Records management, mandated by the Code of Federal Regulations 1220.34. Human trafficking is often linked to organized crime, and the profits from these criminal enterprises fuel other illegal activities. The Department of State has an office to monitor and combat trafficking in persons which encompasses over 110 anti-trafficking programs in over 50 countries. The

Department of Justice, the Department of Health and Human Services and the United States Agency for International Development, and the Department of Labor all play a vital and key role in CTIP as their core missions are linked to these types of crimes. NSPD 22 states that Departments and agencies shall adopt policies and procedures to educate, as appropriate, personnel on assignment or official travel abroad about trafficking in persons. The WG believes CTIP, as an annual requirement, is excessive and should be completed within the first year of initial entry. Section 1220.34 of Title 26, C.F.R., requires agencies to provide guidance and training to all agency personnel on their records management responsibilities, including identification of federal records, in all formats and media. However, the WG believes that the annual records management training requirement for all Service members is excessive; especially for junior enlisted personnel. The WG also believes that records management training be conducted at initial entry and follow-on training determined by the Military Departments. The savings associated with removing these two topics have been captured in Figure 7.



Impact of Deleting CTIP and Reducing Records Management



Light areas indicate the amount of time that would be freed up by eliminating CTIP and reducing the TM requirement by 70% of the Military Service Strength

Source for Military Service Strength: <https://globalsecurity.org/agency/end-strength.htm>

Figure 7

In addition to the modification of these two subjects, the WG observed that the 16 CMT requirements are governed by disparate orders, directives, and laws without a common framework for articulating the requirement. This has resulted in confusion, and in many cases, inflation of the intended requirement. The lack of a common framework not only complicates execution of CMT, it unnecessarily complicates policy development. A common and concise framework would focus and streamline both CMT development and execution. To that end; the development of learning outcome-based DoDIs concisely defining “the what” that is to be

accomplished. Once that has been established, the Services are to determine programs of Instruction, frequency, reporting, and method of delivery – “the how.” This approach will allow the Military Departments to prioritize core training, reduce the burden of CMT, and ultimately improve overall readiness and lethality. The potential immediate impact is that for every 1 hour of CMT savings, approximately 1200 man years are returned to the force. Additionally, this approach will provide clarity and flexibility for leaders, and drive innovation in delivering the standardized learning objectives.


There are potential concerns and challenges with CMT stakeholders, including Congress and OSD Lead Proponents, who may want a more prescriptive framework. ASD(R) will work with stakeholders to continue to shepherd the effort to manage CMT. To ensure compliance with mandates and established learning outcomes, Military Departments will coordinate their CMT curricula through the CMTWG, which includes the OSD Lead Proponents, in accordance with DoD oversight responsibilities.

Although the data does not demonstrate that current CMT requirements consume a large portion of Service members’ training time, this does not mean that the perception that CMTs are onerous is false. The perception may be based on the history of these requirements or that other mandates are the primary driver of the perception.

In the September 2016 Status of Forces Survey of Active Duty Members (SOFS-A) conducted by the Office of People Analytics, a potentially troubling trend was revealed. Since 2012 (the year of the RAND study on General Military Training Standardization and Reduction Options), the percentage of Service members reporting that they were “well prepared” to perform their wartime job based on the effectiveness of their training declined by 6 percentage points overall (ANNEX, Table 12). This trend runs counterintuitive to the 50 percent reduction in CMT over the same period but may be influenced by other factors such as the lowered wartime missions since 2012 (Figure 8). On average CMT accounts for less than 1 percent of an Active Component Service member’s available time, so there are likely other reasons behind the decrease in service members’ ability to perform their wartime tasks.

The WG determined that there is a “middle-ground” between core task training and CMT that is comprised of activities such as information management, surveys, reporting, unit-level administrative actions, logistic activities and external borrowed military manpower requirements (gate-guard, range, tax center, gym attendant, life guards, etc.) that all detract from core task training. The WG found that, at the lowest tactical level, the additive requirements of Combatant Commands, higher operational commands (armies, fleets, corps, divisions, and groups), force commands, and even bases and stations undoubtedly has a cumulative effect. Efforts to identify where the cumulative effect impedes core task training are warranted.

Effectiveness of Training To Perform Wartime Job Percent of All Active Duty Members, by Service



	Aug 04	Aug 05	Aug 06	Aug 07	Aug 08	Aug 09	Jun 10	Jan 11	Jun 12	2013	2014	Feb 16	Sep 16
* Total	73	73	73	71	73	73	74	72	76	73	72	71	70
● Army	68	67	67	65	68	68	69	68	72	69	70	68	67
▲ Navy	76	76	74	73	75	75	75	75	78	73	72	72	70
■ Marine Corps	77	76	78	75	76	76	78	75	78	74	74	73	75
◆ Air Force	74	75	75	76	76	76	79	75	78	77	75	73	73

Figure 8

The Services already recognize this “middle-ground” as a challenge and are addressing the issue. The Army has formalized its approach in their “Reducing Requirements – Brigade and Below” (R2B2) program. The Air Force has an on-going effort to return “Airman Time” by eliminating or reducing requirements. The Marine Corps is currently re-writing Marine Corps Order 1500 with the objective of identifying and eliminating unnecessary requirements. The Navy is accomplishing the same with its Planning Board for Training. The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) has directed a review of all SECNAV instructions with the stated intent of reducing burdens on the fleet. Each Military Service is establishing plans, objectives, actions, and milestones in support of these efforts.

The data to facilitate an hour-by-hour examination of non-CMT core task training distractors does not exist but would be exceptionally useful. Attempts to use proxies for this type of “time study” such as flight hours and full spectrum miles do not produce the insights desired. A potentially powerful tool to further understand the challenge of the “middle-ground” is a “time study” along the lines of the previously envisioned “time study” spin-off from the CAPE Close Combat Strategic Portfolio Review. The purpose of such a study would be to document the hour-by-hour life of a brigade combat team at the company level and below (or another Service’s equivalent formation). This study would be complimentary to the Army’s R2B2 effort and in many ways provide additional rigor to the Army’s efforts. As informative as the SOFS-A is, only a deep dive “time study” can provide the type of data and insights required to take corrective actions where needed. OUSD(P&R) and CAPE will oversee, and a Federally Funded Research and Development Center or the Military Departments will conduct a time study of all impediments to core tactical training (not limited to the list above) and identify potential improvements.

Key Findings:

1. In recent years, the Military Departments have significantly reduced CMT requirements.
2. Current CMT requirements are not overly burdensome (ANNEX, Tables 13, 14, 15).
3. CTIP and Records Management requirements are excessive.
4. A common CMT framework is required.
5. The Military Departments are aggressively addressing any non-core training that impedes readiness and lethality.
6. A look at non CMT and non-core task requirements levied below the Military Service level is warranted.

Recommended Actions:

13. Develop learning outcome based requirements that concisely articulate the expected learning outcome (“the what”). Target completion: February 1, 2018; low risk; no cost. OPR: DASD(FE&T)
14. Determine the program of instruction, frequency, reporting, and method of delivery (“the how”) at the Military Service level. Target completion: April 1, 2018; low risk; no cost. OPR: DASD(FE&T); OCR: Military Departments and the CMTWG. Recommendation requires DSD approval because the OSD currently determine the frequency, reporting and method of delivery.
15. Coordinate curricula through the CMTWG to ensure compliance with learning objectives, outcomes and DoDI 1322.31, “Common Military Training (CMT).” Implement: June 1, 2018; low risk; no cost. OPR: DASD(FE&T); OCR: Military Departments and the CMTWG.
16. Reduce the requirements of Combatting Trafficking in Persons (CTIP) (to within one year of initial entry) and Records Management (to initial entry with follow-on training determined by the Military Departments). Target completion: 1 April 2018; high risk; no cost. OPR: DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) and Defense Human Resources Activity (DHRA); OCR: Military Departments. Requires congressional engagement. Recommendation requires DSD approval due to coordination requirements with the Department of Justice and Congress by DHRA and because DoD CIO is the OSD Lead Proponent for records management and currently determines the frequency, reporting and method of training delivery.
17. Identify additional reductions in non-core military training and activities that adversely affect time for core task training. Target completion: August 1, 2018; medium risk; cost TBD. OPR: OUSD(P&R); OCR: CAPE and the Military Departments.
18. Update various issuances and external mandates (legislation, public law, federal regulations, etc.). Target completion: June 1, 2019; high risk; no cost. OPR: DASD(FE&T).

Conclusion:

There is work to be done to reduce the non-military core training burden on our forces. The amount of reduction is still to be determined through the Military Departments efforts and the efforts of Department.

Strategic Thinking and Professional Military Education Development Working Group

Introduction:

OUSD(P&R), was tasked to review PME policy to determine how to regain a concentration on the art and science of warfighting. The task was scoped to concentrate on the JPME education as delivered by the in-residence senior Service schools (war colleges) courses and the JPME 10-week course taught at the Joint and Combined Warfighting School. The task was further refined to examine if and how the current PME program supports the development of strategic and critical thinking skills. The key questions addressed were: “How do we regain the art and science of warfighting through PME policy?” and “How do we develop strategic competencies and strategic thinkers within the current PME system?”

There is a perception that military officers are not receiving the type or level of education necessary to develop strategically minded officers that are adept in critical thought, clear communication, and fully immersed in the art and science of warfighting.

DASD(FE&T) established a WG with representatives from Office of the DASD(MPP), USD(I), Joint Staff J1 and J7, ASN(M&RA), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations N1, ASAM&RA, Army G357, NGB J37, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Air Force A1, Army War College (AWC), Air University, Naval War College, and Marine Corps University.

The WG assessed current statutes, regulations, and policies governing PME to identify opportunities for improving how those programs function with respect to students, curricula, and utilization. Further, it requested information from both sets of institutions, with emphasis on the inputs to the PME process (students); details with regard to how they are developed while in the PME program (curriculum); and the outputs of the process (utilization after graduation). The WG report captures the complex PME process and highlights the variances across the Services, but structured the data in a common lexicon. In the end, the WG considered whether the force had the right strategic thinkers to support strategic leaders, and made recommendations to ensure this outcome.

Background:

The art and science of war requires an intuitive ability to assess a situation and decide upon a course of action. The science of war applies to those elements that can be measured by scientific methods; conversely, the conduct of war is fundamentally a dynamic process of human competition requiring both the knowledge of science and the creativity of art, but driven ultimately by the power of human will, an attribute that can be enhanced by strategic thinking.

The primary goal of PME is to enable individuals to think critically and creatively in the design and conduct of military operations in the broader context of national objectives. The WG reviewed PME policies related to JPME delivered through the in-residence Service Senior Level Colleges (SLC) and at National Defense University (National War College, Eisenhower School and the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS). The WG then examined if and how Service Developmental Education programs support the development of strategic and critical thinking skills. The review included the following Service PME Advanced Schools (AS): the Army’s School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), the Navy’s Maritime Advanced Warfighting School (MAWS), and the Marine Corp’s School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW).²¹

²¹ A detailed description of SLC and AS, along with other pertinent information can be located in the ANNEX: **Description of Courses, Students, Curricula, Assessments and Conclusions**

Discussion:

Between 1400–1450 officers, civilians, and foreign personnel are annually educated in-residence in Senior SLC. Figure 9 shows throughput by each school. This is a significant supply of senior officers that are presumed to be competent in the art and science of warfighting at the Service and Joint level. Throughput by school varies between 30 per year for Marine Corps War College to approximately 380 per year for the AWC.




Figure 9

The relatively constant total throughput actually masks a recent decline in throughput for active duty officers from all Services, from about 890 to 810 officers per year, as shown in Figure 10. Throughput mirrors end strength and thus the decline reflects the contraction of the force over the past FYs. Some SLC institutions have maintained their capacity during this period by expanding the opportunities for international officers to attend the programs. Other programs have reduced the opportunities for host Service officers to attend in residence while preserving opportunities for representatives from Reserve Component, other Services, civilians, the Interagency, and international officers.




Figure 10

SLC joint curricula are evaluated as part of the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) Process of Accreditation of Joint Education process and are required to “embed JPME topics mandated by law and policy and reflect the mission of their parent Service’s needs.” They must include the following learning areas:

1. National Military Strategy;
2. Joint planning at all levels of war;
3. Joint doctrine;
4. Joint command and control;
5. Joint force and joint requirements development;
6. Operational contract support;
7. National security strategy;
8. Theater strategy and campaigning;
9. Joint planning processes and systems; and
10. Joint, Interagency, and multinational capabilities and the integration of those capabilities.²²

Most SLCs address these topics across five courses: strategy, national security processes, warfighting, the international security environment, and leadership. Figure 11 demonstrates that each school implements its program differently across these metrics and no two “war colleges” are alike. These metrics are an indirect indicator of the intensity and rigor of the education delivered by the programs and received by officers. They can convey the relative emphasis placed on these core “art and science of warfighting” topics in terms of how much material produced by published subject matter experts is discussed between faculty and students in a formalized educational setting, but they cannot capture philosophical or pedagogical differences in how that material, as well as the knowledge and experiences of the students and faculty is used to provide an educational experience. These metrics also do not convey the impact of the education on officer cognitive competencies. The absence of such metrics, beyond the fact that 100 percent of officers meet the minimum requirements to graduate from these programs, limits the ability to discern who our key strategic thinkers are and where they are developed in the SLC system.




Figure 11

In addition to the five phase continuum of PME (pre-commissioning, primary, intermediate, senior, and CAPSTONE), the Services have established advanced schools for O-4s situated between Intermediate Level Education and SLC. Figure 12 shows active duty throughput by each school. Total numbers increased since 2007, primarily due to increases at SAMS and SAASS. Over the past three years, approximately 260 officers, civilians, and

²² CJCSI 1801.01E, pages AA 1-2.

international officers are educated in-residence in AS. Throughput by school today varies between 23 per year for SAW to approximately 120 per year for SAMS.




Figure 12

Approximately 220 U.S. active duty officers are educated in-residence in AS in Academic Year (AY) 2017. As with SLC, total throughput has declined in recent years as the increase from early 2010 has abated. Most pronounced has been the decline in Army officers and throughput at SAMS, although fewer USAF officers are being developed and throughput at SAASS fluctuated at levels about 75 percent of its AY 2012 high water mark. An increase due to an initiative to bring production to 60 students per year. The intensity and selectivity of these schools, combined with lower demand from smaller allied forces, has precluded offsetting the decline with international officers.

Utilization of Service AS officers has three components: flagging their competencies as graduates; placing them in appropriate assignments; and shepherding their career progression. Army and Navy personnel systems formally flag graduates from AS with a skill identifier or subspecialty code, one that may be unique to a subset of those graduates or one that may be shared with officers that are developed through alternative means. The Air Force does not utilize such indicators but instead relies upon the judgment of each community’s Development Team to know which officers are AS graduates. In the Marine Corps, AS graduates receive an Additional Military Occupational Specialty 0505 designation.

With regard to assignment patterns, all Army AS graduates are assigned to either a division, corps, Army Service component command, deployed headquarters, or Combatant Commands. The Air Force AS graduates are proactively assigned to high-impact positions that capitalize on their unique exposure and expertise through the Advanced Studies Group process managed by the Commandant of SAASS. In the Navy, “Following completion of PME, officers shall be assigned per community and individual need. Officers should be preferentially assigned to operational and Joint billets, but may be assigned to other U.S. Navy billets as dictated by the distribution need.” In the Marine Corps, AS graduates are assigned to coded billets on planning staffs. While JAWS is an SLC institution with an advanced planning emphasis, it does have a direct impact on assignment patterns similar to some of the AS institutions.

Findings:

SLCs develop nearly 800 active duty O-5s and O-6s as Joint officers each year. Compliance with CJCS 1800.01E ensures that these officers are exposed to joint matters at all

levels as well as the national security and military strategies – despite variations in how each school implements its curriculum. Each school also covers the core topics in the “art and science of warfighting” with varying degrees of emphasis. The WG necessarily relied on the assumption that each officer who graduates from such programs was sufficiently conversant in these subjects to be considered an applied strategist (i.e., one that is “analytical, pragmatic, innovative, and broadly educated in domestic and international political, technological, economic, scientific, and social trends”). With the exception of graduates from National War College, the Eisenhower School, and JAWS, utilization of these officers is determined entirely by their Service.

ASs develop approximately 225 active duty officers each year and are not required to comply with CJCS 1800.01E. The intensity of the educational experience as indicated by the average number of pages per lesson and per hour of contact between students and faculty, suggests a much deeper exposure to core topics in the “art and science of warfighting.” Yet, the mission of these schools, save SAASS, is to produce strategically-conversant operational-level planners. SAASS’s mission comes closest to producing strategic thinkers along the parameters defined by the WG, but its narrower focus on the air, space, and cyberspace domains indicates that no program is satisfactorily focused on the development of strategic thinkers. Furthermore, utilization of AS graduates is determined entirely by their Service, which vary with regard to whether they explicitly flag and direct these graduates to specific billets that would capitalize on their educational development. The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps do, the Navy does not.

Given DoD’s significant challenges and obstacles, how do we make leaders better at creative and critical thinking? The WG concluded the Department must educate leaders in the knowledge, skills, and terminology associated with thinking competencies and provide the education to challenge ideas and pre-conceptions in order to develop the requisite habits of mind. The best way to teach thinking skills to DoD leaders is to provide a broad education and to practice context-dependent skill development. Officers should be challenged to develop arguments and counter-arguments, in context, to support a theoretically-grounded strategic ideas. Officers need to learn and practice these thinking skills within PME and specialized programs. In the JAWS program, approximately 25 percent of classroom credit hours are spent in a wide range of activities designed to place students either in a realistic environment, in the midst of historical decision making context, or engaged with contemporary decision makers and advisors.

The development of strategic thinkers, in the numbers required, will occur when PME highlights, and makes available, sufficient opportunities among the vast array of topics within their curriculum, for select groups of students. In addition, Services and National Defense University should develop in its instructors the requisite skills to enable strategic thinking in a context-dependent environment and should select instructors that have the background, intelligence, and requisite KSAs to increase their student’s ability to think clearly, and enhance their level of lethality.

The Service schools currently meet the senior level PME (JPME II) education requirements as directed by the CJCS PME instruction. Policy and curriculum changes would enhance the Services’ abilities to develop and effectively assign strategic and critical thinkers to CCDRs and selected other positions. This will in turn increase the Services’ overall competency in planning and conducting warfighting.

The WG determined that DoD PME policy is broad and does not specifically address the development of strategic thinkers. Overall, PME policy falls under the Secretary of Defense’s purview with delivery of JPME through the CJCS via the CJCS 1800.01E Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). The review of the senior Service schools curricula

revealed the schools are meeting stated requirements and that OPMEP requirements do not fully address the development of strategic and critical thinking skills.

There is no definition of “strategic thinker” in doctrine and the DoD abides by the guidance stated in the House Armed Services Committee Panel Report of 1989 (page 28). The report recognizes two main types of strategic thinkers – applied strategists (problem solvers) and theoretical strategists (large scope thinkers). Applied strategists provide the Services with officers who can develop and implement strategic plans and policies, connecting these to campaign and operational plans in order to apply the ideas and achieve the goals set forth by the President and his advisors. Theoretical strategists, in contrast, think about the ideas and goals, as well as their likely subsequent consequences, in order to help frame the choices for strategic decision making and action. Both must be analytical, pragmatic, innovative and broadly educated. To facilitate the implementation of the task, the WG developed the following working definition for “strategic thinkers”:

“Strategic thinkers assist civil and military leaders to balance the art and the science of warfighting when applying lethal and non-lethal military force or the credible threat of such force to accomplish a mission. Theoretical strategists do this by assisting leaders with describing, visualizing, and assessing the applicability and limitations of actions and doctrine to a problem by studying the width, depth, and context of comparable historical campaigns and theoretical ideas. Applied strategists then develop and implement the plans required to bring these ideas to fruition.”

Creating climates in which important aspects of strategic thinking (e.g., reflection, learning, questioning) are valued and promoted is crucial to shifting PME culture to support strategic thinking development. The development of strategic thinkers, in the numbers required, will occur when PME highlights and makes available sufficient opportunities among the vast array of topics within their curriculum, for select groups of students.

Recommended Actions:

19. Publish definition of strategic thinkers. Target completion: January 1, 2018; low risk; no additional cost; OPR: DASD(FE&T).
20. Identify superior intellectual talent resident in the force. Target completion: December 1, 2018; low risk; no additional cost; OPR: Military Departments.
21. Create strategic thinker demand by coding billets and only assigning officers possessing advanced strategic competencies. Target completion: June 1, 2018; low risk; cost TBD; OPR: Military Departments and CCMDs.
22. Develop innovative approaches to talent management and education to enhance the Joint Force. Target completion: December 1, 2018; low risk; no additional cost; OPR: Joint Staff (J7) and JLDC.
23. Manage career progression of strategic thinkers. Target completion: December 1, 2018; medium risk; no additional cost; OPR: Military Departments.
24. Establish strategic thinker master’s program based on the original Art of War Program (small, exclusive, ~8 students). Target completion: August 1, 2018; low risk; cost \$600-900K/year; student billets funded through existing JPME quotas (~2 per Service); OPR: DASD(FE&T); OCR: Joint Staff (J7).
25. Review OPMEP for a more focused approach on warfighting to ensure curricula support global operations. Target completion: December 1, 2018; low risk; no additional cost; OPR: Joint Staff (J7).

Secondary Recommended Actions:

- Promote existing specialized PME programs (Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program (ASP3), Ike Skelton Art of War Scholars program in Army ILE/CGSC, MAWS, SAMS, SAW, and SAASS).
- Establish OSD essay competition on a strategic topic to aid in officer identification.
- JLDC establish Service schools war gaming competition on a strategic topic to aid in officer identification.

Conclusion:

There is a need for a small cadre of “Strategic Thinkers” that goes above and beyond what the current AS are designed to produce. The WG agreed that DoD needs to expand existing Service AS programs while simultaneously developing a highly selective Strategic Thinker development school founded on the principles of the original Art of War Program. This Joint school would specifically target the education of officers at the O-4 level on strategic decision-making, using interactive case studies as problem-solving experiences and drawing on the disciplines of applied strategic studies and history (including the importance of economics, culture, geography, etc.). This school will provide select officers with the contextual ideas and information needed to become more effective in their profession and to develop their critical and creative thinking ability. This program should be based on the methodology and program of the Art of War, and, would provide a Master’s Degree in Strategy to qualifying students. The program should use a framework that includes the use of analytical tools that will allow the students to understand and find the most optimal solutions in an increasingly complex world, and that can transform the way they think, behave, and interact with military peers and allies at all levels. These tools will be used to support the decision-making processes of the Military Departments and Combatant Commands in developing and accomplishing strategic objectives and tactical execution.

Strengthening DoD Counterintelligence Working Group

Introduction:

The Secretary of Defense directed that the Department “return to counterintelligence competencies for the Services law enforcement agencies.” USD(I) was responsible for addressing this task within the larger effort of policy review and enhancing readiness and lethality. The Counterintelligence (CI) WG sought to answer the question, “How do we facilitate more effective counterintelligence support within the Department?” They were aided by the Military Department Counterintelligence Organizations, DIA, and the Joint Staff.²³

Background:

DoD’s CI personnel are interwoven throughout the Department (Figure 13), with a bulk of them contained in the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and DIA (ANNEX, Table 16). AFOSI and NCIS are primarily law enforcement organizations, while INSCOM and DIA are home to intelligence and security functions, but have no law enforcement authorities or mission. In addition to an internal CI role, DIA executes the roles of Defense CI Manager, responsible for centralized management of DoD CI activities to include management of a National Intelligence Program funding for CI, prioritizing and validating CI requirements, providing advanced and joint CI training and professional certification, developing managing and maintain shared CI information systems, along with other functions as defined in DoD Directive 5240.02. Regardless of differences in the model used to deliver CI support or the component’s role in the CI enterprise, all of the components agree that *increasing CI threats and demand for CI activities are stressing current resources and structure.*

DoD CI: a High-demand, Low-density Resource
Approximately 6,000 Personnel
Serving 42 DoD Components including:
3 Military Departments
10 Combatant Commands
19 Defense Agencies
8 Field Activities
Joint, DoDIG, and OSD Staffs

Figure 13

Discussion:

The CI risk from hostile foreign actors is increasing, along with DoD’s exposure to that risk. The Department faces sustained, significant threats from exceptionally diverse and sophisticated adversaries—foreign intelligence services, terrorists, cyber intruders, malicious insiders and foreign criminal enterprises—that use overt, covert and clandestine activities in both

²³ This unclassified report is supplemented by a classified report.

the physical and the cyber domain to exploit the Department's vulnerabilities and undermine its military and technological advantages. The volume and complexity of these threats challenge the Department's ability to meet today's growing demand for critical CI support while preparing for future challenges.

Our prime adversaries attack the Department's interests through focused, long-range, whole-of-government campaigns, yet DoD is challenged to respond in kind. Although USD(I) and DIA are both authorized to centrally manage CI activities, strategies, and information systems, gaps remain between Component CI activities that adversaries exploit. Agile adversaries attack Department equities at a pace faster than standard DoD methods for tasking and synchronizing activities, and developing enabling technologies. As a result, DoD CI remains a loosely formed enterprise, adapting at a mid-20th century tempo, bound to unsynchronized objectives, and outclassed by adversaries that understand our limitations and rapidly adapt and apply 21st century capabilities. Cognizant of the risk, the Secretary's July 21, 2017 memorandum called for "a return to counterintelligence competencies."

Findings:

The Military Departments and DIA remain committed to supporting commanders and decision makers at all echelons with the full spectrum of CI activities and analysis. All report that their basic CI workforce is competent, highly dedicated to mission, and well-trained by available DoD schools. In addition, all components affirm their CI personnel and resources are dispatched against valid CI requirements. In short, there are no systemic issues in CI training or individual competencies, nor are CI resources systemically dispatched against non-CI requirements.

However, the Department's CI force experiences shortfalls in desired effectiveness. These shortfalls are based on the Department's inability to act uniformly in response to CI threats, relying on individual service responses and sometimes on a "coalition of the willing" to address emergent problems. This lack of a unified approach manifests in multiple challenges including; a lack of common information systems to enable effective CI activities, cumbersome or non-existent governance to focus CI activities and investments, loss of skilled polygraph personnel through pay inequities, and a high "tooth-to-tail" ratio that drains scarce manpower away from effective engagements. Two notable injurious effects of this shortfall stand out. One is an inefficient and disjointed Screening and Vetting (SaV) operation that allows potential Insider Threats to enter the Department. Additionally, Combatant Commands (COCOM) report CI manpower shortfalls and insufficient analytical resources, which decrease the effectiveness of CI activities in direct engagement against adversaries which undermines DoD's technological edge and lethality. (These concerns are identified in the classified report.)

In recent years the pace and vigor of our foreign adversaries has highlighted DoD CI's lack of agility and effectiveness at addressing issues that transcend Component boundaries. Information sharing; investing in, developing, or implementing systems that maintain a technological edge by leveraging DoD "big data" would exponentially enable CI effectiveness. The Department must establish community-wide information systems specifically for the CI community which ensure the efficient and secure leveraging of information. This would further enable CI analysis to support operations, investigations and risk decisions, support information sharing and deconfliction of activities, as well as ensure timely transmission of threat information, to include insider threats. To synchronize CI activities, investments, and speak with a unified voice, USD(I) should establish a CI Strategy and Campaign Synchronization Group at the three-star level. The USD(I) should chair the body with membership including the Joint

Staff, DIA Director, applicable Military Department three-star representatives, and others as required. To ensure unity of effort across components, DoD must accelerate the production of a DoD CI Strategy as well as establish CI campaign plans against prime adversaries. To reduce impacts on readiness, DoD must centralize and modernize Screening and Vetting (SaV) for military accessions at one organization. Application of advanced data analytic techniques, coupled with intelligently designed interviewing, will significantly improve the quality of the SaV mission while reducing time and manpower requirements. Current estimates indicate that this centralization could reduce the manpower required from over 600, at present, to less than 75.

Addressing Perception of Non-CI Tasks Depleting CI Mission:

Discussion with senior OSD and Joint Staff officers indicate there is high-level concern that CI personnel are performing excessive non-CI tasks unrelated to their core missions, leading to atrophied skills and depleted CI resources. The WG did not identify any administrative burdens unique to CI personnel. However, we note that the bulk of Army's operational force has been employed for the last year conducting SaV of non-citizen military accessions, diverting them from their CI core mission. Some Combatant Commands staffs reported the perception that CI personnel from NCIS and AFOSI are sometimes unavailable for CI tasks because they are called to investigate non-CI related crimes. From discussion with current and former NCIS and AFOSI leaders, we find that while from a local level this perception may appear valid, it does not take into account that frequently non-CI investigators are tasked to assist in CI investigations.

Recommended Actions:

26. Discontinue reliance on CI agents for vetting non-citizen accessions by establishing a dedicated screening and vetting capability. Implement by 1 June 2018; medium risk; no cost; OPR: USD(I). Implementation will bring cost savings to DoD, reducing manpower required by 1/6th of current. Centralizing this function will also decrease CI risk while realizing a cost-savings and increasing analytical capability for all SaV missions. Requires Deputy Secretary of Defense approval.
27. Accelerate and update 2013 DoD CI strategy and develop CI campaigns against primary adversaries. Target completion: 1 October 2018. Complete 4 campaign plans against primary adversaries. Target completion: 1 December 2018; low risk, no cost; OPR: USD(I). Efforts already underway which will close gaps and ensure unity of effort.
28. Align Resources to Priorities. To ensure alignment to updated strategy and campaigns, and to increase "Tooth to Tail Ratio," conduct major issue study of all CI resources cross-walked with CI requirements. Target completion: 1 December 2018; low risk; no cost, OPR: USD(I). Results will inform the Department where its gaps are to help guide further investment, particularly in areas where investment would bring cross-service benefit.
29. Apply Strategic Leadership. Implement a CI strategy and campaign synchronization group to synchronize CI activities and investments while pursuing a unified strategy, with particular focus on CI issues with cross-organizational impact. Implement by 1 January 2018; low risk; no cost; OPR: USD(I). Chaired by USD(I) with membership including DIA Director, applicable Service and Joint Staff three-star representatives.
30. Invest in common information systems for the CI community that ensure the efficient and modern leveraging and sharing of data. Implement 1 January 2018; medium risk; cost TBD (relatively low cost investment will return big improvement); OPR: USD(I).

31. Stem the loss of critical, highly skilled polygraphers. Implement 1 January 2018; low risk; low cost, cost savings when considering fewer re-hiring actions; OPR: USD(I).

Conclusion:

The DoD CI Enterprise contributes to readiness and lethality by conducting full spectrum CI support to identify, neutralize, and exploit threats posed by hostile intelligence services, international terrorist organizations, insider threats and unauthorized disclosures. The Department must take multiple, inter-departmental, as well as intra-departmental steps to improve and focus CI activities to provide the most effective support to commanders. The Department should protect against potential insider threats by modernizing and centralizing SaV of non-citizen accessions, and take steps to build the DoD CI Enterprise.